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Calderon: The World of the Dead

THE WORLD OF THE DEAD, THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER,
AND
THE POWER OF INFORMATION

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Shipley v. City of New York1
(decided June 10, 2015)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The common law right of sepulcher is an old rule that protects
the next of kin’s right to find peace and comfort in the act of burying
a loved one.2 The New York State legislature recognizes the importance of protecting the next of kin’s right to interment and has
codified this right in New York Public Health Law (“NYPHL”) article 42.3 Therefore, a plaintiff may bring an action under the common
law right of sepulcher and the applicable section of NYPHL article
42 when an interference to the right of proper burial occurs.4 New
York courts have broadly interpreted the issues surrounding the right
to bury a loved one.5 This broad interpretation has permitted compensation for the interference with the right to bury.6 However, there
is a tendency to apply a narrow interpretation resulting in a deprecia-

1

37 N.E.3d 58 (N.Y. 2015).
Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 877 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009).
3 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (citing to Patterson v.
Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574 (“The decent burial of the dead is a matter in which the public has
concern, and it is against the public health if it does not take place, at all, and against a proper public sentiment, that it should not take place with decency.”)).
4 See, e.g., Rugova v. City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.S.3d 233, 237 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015)
(claiming a loss of sepulcher and violation of NYPHL § 4214).
5 See, e.g., Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1896) (circumventing the argument that because there is “no such thing as a property value in human remains,”
there is not a valid injury claim).
6 See Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 95 N.E. 695, 696 (N.Y. 1911) (holding that plaintiff
can recover monetary loss for wounded feelings and mental distress).
2
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tion of the common law right of sepulcher.7 Specifically, Shipley v.
City of New York failed to uphold the next of kin’s right to proper
burial when it narrowly interpreted both the common law right of
sepulcher and NYPHL § 4215.8
This Note argues that New York courts must apply a broad interpretation of both the common law and statute to protect the survivor’s right to interment. It also proposes that a notification requirement is essential to the continued protection of the next of kin’s right
of sepulcher. In Section II, this Note analyzes the issue presented in
Shipley. Section III explores the relationship between the common
law and the statute. Finally, Section IV discusses the impact a narrow interpretation has on the right of sepulcher, and why the legislature should amend the statute to include a notification requirement.
II.

SHIPLEY V. CITY OF NEW YORK
A.

Factual and Procedural History

Jesse Shipley, a high school student, died in an auto accident.9
Shortly after his death, his parents (the “Shipleys”) agreed to the performance of an autopsy but cautioned the Medical Examiner
(“M.E.”) to maintain the body in a condition “as presentable as possible” for burial purposes.10 At the conclusion of the autopsy, the
M.E. placed the brain in a jar, labeled it with Jesse’s name and the
date of the accident, and placed the jar on a shelf.11 It was standard
procedure for the M.E. to withhold the organ so that a
neuropathologist, who came to the office when at least six specimens
were available, could examine it.12 The Shipleys became aware that
the M.E. retained their son’s brain when students visited the New
York Office of Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”).13 However, the
Shipleys’ priest informed them that without the organ, the funeral
7 See, e.g., Harris-Cunningham v. Med. Exam’r of N.Y. County, 690 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999) (holding that the written consent requirement did not apply to the
medical examiner).
8 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66.
9 Id. at 59.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 59-60.
12 Id. at 60.
13 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60.
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was performed improperly.14 As a result, a second funeral was held
months after the first funeral.15
The Shipleys commenced an action in New York Supreme
Court against the City of New York and the OCME claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the display and alleged mishandling of the brain, and unlawful interference with “the
Shipleys’ right to decedent’s whole body.”16 The defendants argued
that the Shipleys failed to state a claim because the M.E. had the
authority to perform the autopsy, and the law authorized the removal
and retention of the organ.17 The New York Supreme Court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the defendants
appealed to the Appellate Division for the Second Department.18
The Appellate Division held that the M.E. had statutory authority to use its discretion in conducting an autopsy and retaining
organs for further examination.19 However, the power to retain the
organs was extinguished at the completion of a legitimate purpose.20
The Appellate Division further held that the M.E. had a mandated
obligation under both NYPHL § 4215(1) and the common law right
of sepulcher “to turn over the decedent’s remains to the next of kin
for preservation and proper burial.”21 Furthermore, the court viewed
this obligation to be ministerial in nature, which was for the benefit
of and owed to the next of kin.22 Informing the next of kin that although the body was ready for burial, the M.E. would retain particular
organs for further examination could have satisfied this obligation.23
The notice would allow for a proper burial because the next of kin,
who knew what is needed for their ritual to be complete, could make
an informed decision to either bury the body without the organs or
wait for the completion of the necessary examination and then bury
the body with the organs.24 Thus, the case went to trial on the issue
14

Id. at 69 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Id.
16 Id. at 60 (majority opinion).
17 Id. at 60.
18 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60.
19 Id. at 61.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.; see also Lauer v. City of N.Y., 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that a governmental discretionary act renders a city immune to liability while a ministerial act does
not).
23 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 61.
24 Id.
15

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 [2016], Art. 7

788

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

of whether the M.E. had failed to notify the Shipleys of the retention
of their son’s brain.25 The jury entered a verdict in favor of the
Shipleys for $1 million.26 The defendants subsequently appealed to
the Appellate Division for the Second Department where no relief
was found, and finally to the Court of Appeals of New York.27
B.

The Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals of New York rejected the Appellate Division’s decision in favor of the Shipleys, and held that mandating a
notification requirement “was [an] error that broadly expanded the
M.E.’s obligations under common law and statute.”28 In coming to
this conclusion, the court analyzed the common law right of
sepulcher and NYPHL article 42.29 First, in analyzing the common
law right of sepulcher, the court interpreted the phrase “affords the
next of kin the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for burial
purpose” to mean an immediate possession of the body with or without internal organs or tissue samples.30 The court reasoned that the
purpose of the right was to afford the next of kin solace and comfort
through the ritual of burying the decedent’s body. 31 Therefore, the
return of the body, regardless of the presence of the internal organs,
achieved that goal.32
Next, the Court of Appeals scrutinized NYPHL article 42 and
held that there was no ministerial duty to return any organs or tissue
samples or to notify the next of kin.33 The court reasoned that the
M.E. had a “fairly broad” statutory authority to conduct autopsies under NYPHL article 42, and, therefore, their acts were discretionary,
not ministerial.34
25

Id. at 61.
Id.
27 Id. at 62.
28 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 64; see Shipley v. City of N.Y., 908 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 2010) (referencing Appellate Division’s decision affirming the denial of defendant’s
motion of summary judgment and imposing a notification requirement).
29 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 63.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 63.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 66.
34 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62; see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4209 (McKinney 1983)
(providing a list of professionals who are authorized to perform an autopsy); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4210 (McKinney 2014) (conferring authority on a licensed medical physi26

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/7

4

Calderon: The World of the Dead

2016

THE WORLD OF THE DEAD

789

The court also found that the legislature did not intend to include the terms “organs or tissue samples” within the meaning of
“remains of the body.”35 The court reasoned that had the legislature
intended to include organs or tissue samples, it would have included
the terms “any tissue, organs, or part thereof.”36 For instance, other
sections of NYPHL article 42 and NYPHL § 1389 contain the language “any tissue, organs or part thereof.”37 Moreover, the court read
§ 4200(1)38 and § 4215(1)39 in tandem and determined that there was
no language in the statute, expressed or implied, that would require
the M.E. to return any organs or tissue samples retained after a lawful
autopsy.40 Therefore, since the M.E. is a public employee performing
a governmental function, the decision to conduct the autopsy and
retain the organ was a discretionary act.41 As a result of this discretionary act, the city was not subject to liability.42
Finally, the court declined to impose a notification requirement because of practical and policy considerations.43 Specifically,
the court was concerned that the provision did not address when or
under what circumstances the M.E. should send the notification.44

cian); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210 (McKinney 2015) (limiting the power to dissect or conduct autopsy).
35 Shipley, 37 N.E. at 64.
36 Id. at 65; for further discussion of this issue, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4216
(McKinney 2015), N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4217 (McKinney 2015), and N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4218 (McKinney 2015), which applies a criminal penalty for “body stealing,
receiving a stolen dead human being, and opening graves” respectively.
37 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 65.
38 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (“Except in the cases in which a right
to dissect it is expressly conferred by law, every body of a deceased person, within this state,
shall be decently buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after death.”).
39 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215 (1) (McKinney 2015).
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a deceased person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of
interference with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the
body after dissection as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection
have been accomplished.
Id.
40 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66.
41 Id. at 66.
42 Id. at 62 (quoting Valdez v. City of N.Y., 960 N.E.2d 356 (N.Y. 2012) “[M.E.’s] conduct involved the ‘exercise of reasoned judgment’ that ‘may not result in the [City's] liability
even [if] the conduct [was] negligent.’”).
43 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66.
44 Id. at 67.
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Also, the Appellate Division presumed that all of the next of kin
wanted notice, and this assumption would lead to an influx of litigants claiming “that they possessed a property interest in their decedent’s organs.”45
C.

A Strong Dissent

Judge Jenny Rivera authored a dissent admonishing the
majority for failing to uphold the next of kin’s right of sepulcher
under the common law and statute.46 In so doing, the dissent emphasized that the purpose of the common law right of sepulcher is to defend the next of kin’s right to a proper burial.47 In addition, the dissent noted that the plain language of NYPHL sections 4200 and 4215
protects the right of interment.48 Finally, the dissent argued that under NYPHL article 42, the M.E.’s authority to conduct an autopsy
and retain the remains of the body is limited.49 Therefore, the M.E.
has a ministerial duty based on the limitation, and thus the OCME
was subject to liability.50
Specifically, the dissent argued that the common law right of
sepulcher, NYPHL sections 4200 and 4215, and New York City’s
Health Code imposed a ministerial duty.51 Arguably, once the M.E.
fulfilled the lawful purpose of possessing the body, performing an
autopsy, and retaining any parts of the body, a ministerial duty arose
that obligated the “proper return of all body parts for burial purposes.”52 Moreover, the ministerial duty indicated legislative’s intent to
protect the corporal remains of the deceased and the feelings of family members.53
45

Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 67 (citing Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir.
2009)).
46 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 74 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 69.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 70; but see Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62 (majority opinion) (holding that the M.E.’s
authority is fairly broad).
50 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 74 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 70-71; (citing N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 557(f)(1) (2015). Conducting an autopsy
may be done if a person died from a criminal act or the deceased died suddenly but the cause
of death was not apparent. Id. However, an autopsy will not be conducted if “it may be concluded with reasonable certainty that death occurred from natural causes or obvious traumatic injury, and there are no other circumstances which would appear to require an autopsy unless the medical examiner deems the autopsy necessary in accordance with the law.”) Id.
52 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 75 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 74.
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Furthermore, the dissent adopted a broad interpretation of the
common law right of sepulcher and NYPHL article 42 to determine
the legislature’s intent.54 First, the dissent focused on the only provision under NYPHL article 42 that deals with “the retention of organs
upon completion of an autopsy.”55 NYPHL § 4215(2) states in relevant part “that the persons having possession of the [unclaimed] body
may, in their discretion, cause it to be either buried or cremated or
may retain parts of such body for scientific purposes.”56 The dissent
reasoned that “parts of such body” is a subsection of “remains of the
body” because the individual may retain “‘parts’ rather than the
whole of the body, upon completion of the autopsy.”57 Hence, in
NYPHL § 4215(1), “remains of the body” means that organs are included with the cadaver “because the reference to ‘parts of such
body’ in NYPHL § 4215(2) would be unnecessary.”58
Second, the limitation in NYPHL § 4215(2) allowing for the
retention of “parts of such body” exclusively for scientific purposes
supported the proposition that remains of the body includes organs
because “organs are commonly used for scientific study.”59 Additionally, the interpretation that “remains of the body” contained
organs within its meaning applied to the entire section 4215 because
“the meaning of a single section may not be determined by splitting it
up into several parts.”60 Furthermore, NYPHL article 43, dealing
with anatomical gifts, included organs within its meaning of “parts of
the body.”61
54

Id. at 69–72.
Id. at 72.
56 Id.
57 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 69-72 (Rivera, J., dissenting):
In all cases in which an autopsy or dissection has been made of an
unclaimed body, the provisions of this article requiring the burial or
other lawful disposition of the body of a deceased person and punishing,
interference with or injuries to it, shall apply equally to the remains of
such body as soon as the lawful purposes of such autopsy or dissection
have been accomplished, except that the persons having possession of
the body may, in their discretion, cause it to be either buried or cremated,
or may retain parts of such body for scientific purposes.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215(2) (McKinney 2015).
58 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 73.
59 Id. at 72.
60 Id. (citing N.Y. CONS. LAWS BOOK 1, STATUTES § 97, COMMENT (McKinney 2015)).
61 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d. at 73 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4300 (5) (McKinney 2015) “
‘Part’ of a body includes organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and other
portions of a human body, and ‘part’ includes ‘parts.’ ”).
55
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Lastly, the dissent agreed with the Appellate Division that a
notification requirement should be imposed on the M.E.62 The dissent reasoned that a notification requirement would ensure the next of
kin are aware of the condition of the body before preparing for burial.63 Without the information, the next of kin would be unable to
exercise their right of sepulcher.64
III.

THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF SEPULCHER AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO NYPHL ARTICLE 42

The right of sepulcher is an important common law right.65
Burial rituals have been performed for centuries and throughout the
world.66 People have a natural desire to bury their dead, and these
rituals allow family members to find comfort.67 New York State has
an abundance of religions that practice different burial rituals and the
common law right of sepulcher seeks to prevent interference with
these rituals.68 Specifically, the common law is the next of kin’s
absolute right “to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for
preservation and burial.”69 If a “person unlawfully interferes with
that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body,” damages are
awarded against that person “as compensation to the next of kin” for
the emotional injury that resulted from their inability to conduct a
proper burial.70
62

Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 76.
Id.
64 Id.
65 Bambrick v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr., 593 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1993).
66 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304; see Elizabeth C. Burton, M.E., Religions and the Autopsy,
MEDSCAPE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1705993-overview (illustrating that the ancient Egyptians would mummify their deceased by embalming the body
and enshrouding it in strips of linen); see also Mummification, THE BRITISH MUSEUM,
http://www.ancientegypt.co.uk/mummies/home.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (showing
that the Roman Empire imposed a religious duty upon the surviving kin to perform religious
ceremonies before the actual burial).
67 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
68 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Burton, M.E., Religions and the Autopsy, MEDSCAPE, Mar. 21,
2012, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1705993-overview (last visited Nov. 1, 2015)
(illustrating different practices in Judaism, Hinduism, and Christianity); See also Melfi, 877
N.Y.S.2d at 304 (citing to various religions and cultures practicing burial rituals).
69 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240.
70 Id. See Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (defining the term “right of sepulcher” to mean the
right to bury a body in a tomb or monument, as opposed to “the right of sepulture” which is
the right of interment. The terms have been fused together through the years and today the
right of sepulcher encompasses both meanings); sepulcher is pronounced [sep-uh l ker].
63
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New York State has codified the common law right of sepulcher in NYPHL § 4200.71 The statute protects the next of kin’s right
to perform a proper burial while ensuring the public’s health and
concerns.72 Furthermore, NYPHL article 4200 “does not circumvent
or abrogate any rights or causes of action which have existed under
the common law for hundreds of years.”73 Therefore, the purpose of
the statute is to protect the right to bury a loved one under a particular
religious belief.74 Lastly, NYPHL § 4210(c) provides a religious
exemption, which is indicative of the protection afforded to survivors. 75
A.

The Creation of the Right of Sepulcher: A Broad
Interpretation

Larson v. Chase76 is the first court in the United States to hold
that interference with the common law right of sepulcher will entitle
the next of kin to compensation for mental suffering and injury to his
or her feelings if the injury is the natural and proximate cause of the
wrongful act.77 A widow brought an action against the defendant for
the unlawful dissection of her husband’s body that caused her mental
suffering and nervous shock.78
The defendant argued that the widow could not maintain a
cause of action because the widow did not have a “legal interest in or
right to the body,” and the widow could not sustain a claim since a
“body is not property.”79 The defendant also argued that a claim for
“mental anguish and injury to the feelings” is only actionable if it is
71 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (citing Patterson v. Patterson, 1875 WL 10590 (1875); citing In re Kraemer’s Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx Cty. 1944), which states that the burial of a deceased is “not only a common law duty
in the interest of public health and decency but it has been made a statutory duty which may
devolve even upon strangers; citing Correa v. Maimonides, 629 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cty. 1995)).
72 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210(C) (McKinney 2015); see www.nyc.gov. stating in their
website that if a family raises a realistic religious objection based on “Judaism, Islam, Christian Science, Jehovah’s Witness, or 7th Day Adventist,” the family is allowed an opportunity
to object).
76 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891).
77 Id. at 239.
78 Id. at 238.
79 Id.
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accompanied by an actual physical “injury to person or property.”80
However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected defendant’s arguments and reasoned that the widow had a legal right to the possession of her husband’s body because she was “intimately and closely
connected with the deceased by domestic ties and that this was a right
which the law will recognize and protect.”81
Moreover, the court analyzed “the doctrine that a corpse is not
property,” to justify its decision.82 In a limited discussion of the history of the disposition and burial of the body after death, the court
explained that the notion that a dead body had no property value was
the rule of the land under ecclesiastical law.83 In England, churches
had the authority to take possession of a dead body for burial purposes, and the church enforced the rules of sepulcher.84 As a result, the
next of kin did not have “a property interest in the body or ashes of
an ancestor, and thus no legal remedy.”85 This view changed when
ecclesiastical law was no longer the rule during colonial times, and
courts conferred the duty of timely and decently burying a corpse on
the next of kin.86 However, the issue of whether the next of kin could
recover for a violation of the right of sepulcher when a corpse did not
have a property value remained.87 Courts tried to sidestep this issue
by allowing recovery of mental anguish when the tort of trespass was
present.88
The court in Larson creatively cured this matter when it imposed a property value in the exclusive right to the possession of a
decedent’s body for burial.89 The court reasoned that the property
value in the exclusive right led to the conclusion that the body “is his
property in the broadest and most general sense of the term.”90 The
right allowed the widow to recover for her injuries solely for mental
80

Id.
Larson, 50 N.W. at 239.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 238.
84 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
85 Patrick J. Mulqueen, “Only Dust Remains[?]”: The 9/11 Memorial Litigation And the
Reach of Quasi-Property Rights, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 254 (2012).
86 Id. at 254.
87 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
88 Id. See also Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868) (claiming mental anguish for disturbing and removing the body of an infant buried in a cemetery under an action for trespass).
89 Larson, 50 N.W. at 239.
90 Id. at 239.
81
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suffering and nervous shock without proving pecuniary damages.91
In New York, Larson became a seminal case, and many New York
courts have cited to the opinion.92
Subsequently, in Foley v. Phelps,93 the New York Appellate
Division for the First Department held that a widow had a legal right
to the possession of her husband’s body “in the same condition it was
in when death supervened.”94 The deceased was a man who died at a
hospital after falling into an elevator shaft.95 The widow “begged and
implored” the hospital not to perform an autopsy, but it was
nevertheless done.96
The issue was whether the widow could maintain an action
when there was no property value in human remains.97 The First Department relied on Larson and reasoned that there was a quasiproperty value in human remains.98 That value was found in the duty
to protect the decedent’s body from violation and was “imposed by
the universal feelings of mankind.”99 However, the court did not base
its holding on a quasi-property principle.100 Rather, the court relied
on the widow’s legal right to possess the decedent’s body for purposes of burying the “corpse, and to preserve its remains.”101 Finally, the
court required the return of the decedent’s body in the same condition
that it was in at the time death occurred, and “not merely to such a
hacked, hewed, and mutilated corpse as some stranger .”102 The court

91

Id.
See, e.g., Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (citing to Larson); see Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 472
(citing to Larson); see Darcy, 95 N.E. at 696 (citing to Larson); see Mulqueen, supra note 87
(“the seminal case of Larson v. Chase delineated the quasi-property right quite broadly.”).
93 37 N.Y.S 471 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1896). Prior to Foley, and while N.Y. courts cited to
Larson, the issue of whether the next of kin could recover for a violation of the right of sepulcher when a corpse did not have a property value remained. Courts tried to sidestep this
issue by allowing recovery for mental anguish when the tort of trespass was present. Melfi,
877 N.Y.S.2d at 307. See also Driscoll, 99 Mass. at 284 (allowing compensation for mental
anguish resulting from the disturbance and removal of an infant deceased body in an action
for trespass).
94 Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474.
95 Id. at 471.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 473.
98 Id.
99 Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 473 (citing to Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I.
227 (1872)).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 474.
92
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declined to determine the measure of damages.103
In Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp.,104 the New York Court of
Appeals decided the issue of damages and held that the surviving
next of kin “is entitled to maintain the action and to recover damages
for her wounded feelings and mental distress.”105 The plaintiff’s son
died while under the care of the defendant.106 The mother asked for
her son’s remains, but the hospital refused to deliver the body to a
funeral director, and instead performed an autopsy.107 The mother
claimed that the defendant interfered with her right to possess the
body when the autopsy was done and caused her wounded feelings
and mental anguish.108 The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.109
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that a cause of action did exist because the right to the possession of the body for burial purposes is a right that the law recognizes and protects. 110 Moreover, the law awards damages to the wounded feelings of the claimant
even in the absence of pecuniary damages to protect this right.111
New York courts continued their broad interpretation in Hassard v. Lehane.112 The Appellate Division for the First Department
held that an M.E. was not justified in keeping body parts after an
authorized autopsy in the absence of further direction of a coroner or
district attorney.113 A twenty-eight-year-old man was injured while
driving home from a funeral.114 The man was taken to the hospital
where he later died.115 The hospital’s representatives did not ask the
mother for permission to conduct an autopsy.116 They subsequently
dissected his body, removed his spleen, cut it into little pieces, and
preserved it in a jar of alcohol.117 Although the deceased did not die
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id.
95 N.E. 695 (N.Y. 1911).
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Darcy, 95 N.E. at 696.
Id.
Id. at 696.
128 N.Y.S. 161, 164 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1911).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
Hassard, 128 N.Y.S. at 162.
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in a suspicious way, the M.E. argued his acts were justified.118
However, the court found that viewing the body without an autopsy
would have sufficed in determining the cause of death.119
The court reasoned that New York Code § 310 did not confer
authority to retain such body parts.120 The statute states in relevant
part that, “[w]here a dissection has been made, requiring the burial of
a dead body[,] . . . [the provisions of this article] apply equally to the
remains of the body dissected, as soon as the lawful purposes of such
dissection have been accomplished.”121 This section is the equivalent
of the present statute, NYPHL § 4215 and uses the language “apply
equally to the remains of the body.”122
Finally, in Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hospital,123 the Appellate Division for the First Department held that a loss of sepulcher claim accrues when the next of kin becomes aware of the act that caused the
interference to the right of sepulcher.124 The defendant never notified
the next of kin that the deceased, a famous playwright, had died.125
Instead, the hospital sent the body to a community college for
embalming practices and then buried the decedent in “Potter’s Field,”
a mass grave site.126 The Melfis learned of the death two months later when a hotel manager called Mr. Melfi’s niece.127 The Melfis enlisted the help of local media to locate the final resting place of Mr.
Melfi.128
118

Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
120 Id. at 163.
121 Id. (pertaining to the Penal Code § 310, all situations “where a dissection has been
made, requiring the burial of a dead body, and other provisions of the Penal Code punishing
interference with and injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the body dissected, as
soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection have been accomplished.”).
122 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215 (McKinney 2015).
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a deceased person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of
interference with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the
body after dissection as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection
have been accomplished.
Id.
123 877 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2009).
124 Id. at 309.
125 Id. at 302.
126 Id. (obtaining fame through works such as “Birdbath” and “Oh! Calcutta!”).
127 Id. at 303.
128 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
119
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In 2002, the decedent’s brother filed a notice of claim stating
that Mr. Melfi died in 2001, and the hospital failed to notify the family of the death.129 The defendant moved for dismissal of the
complaint arguing that under the requirement for service of claim, the
family failed to file within 90-days.130 The court rejected defendant’s
argument and reasoned that although the violation that caused the interference occurred in 2001, the plaintiff’s emotional injury did not
occur until the knowledge of its existence surfaced in 2002.131 Therefore, “the 90-day clock” started to run in 2002 when the family became aware that Mr. Melfi’s body had been mutilated and buried in
Potter’s field.132
B.

An Emerging Trend: A Narrow Interpretation

New York courts have begun to narrowly interpret both the
common law and the statutory right of sepulcher.133 Consequently,
this shift from broadly interpreting the right to narrowly interpreting
it has weakened the common law right of sepulcher.134 This weakening of the right is evident when courts decide on similar issues but
come to different conclusions based on their interpretation.135
For instance, the Appellate Division for the Second Department in Bambrick v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr.136 broadly interpreted
NYPHL § 4214 to allow for family members to recover for the performance of an unauthorized autopsy.137 Under § 4214, a hospital is
required to receive written consent before administering an autopsy.138 After the plaintiff sought damages for the performance of an
unauthorized autopsy, the hospital argued that the failure to secure a
written consent was not “dispositive of the liability issue.”139
However, the court rejected the defendant’s argument and held that

129

Id.
Id.
131 Id. at 309.
132 Id. at 310.
133 See infra notes 144, 151.
134 See, e.g., Juseinoski v. N.Y Hosp., 795 N.Y.S.2d 753 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005)
(denying recovery to Muslim plaintiffs because the hospital did not conduct the autopsy).
135 See infra note 145.
136 593 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1993).
137 Id. at 255.
138 Id. at 254.
139 Id. at 254.
130
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the lack of a written consent did warrant the imposition of liability.140
Further, the court reasoned that the purpose of the written requirement “was designed to afford relatives greater control over the disposition of the remains of their decedents.”141 Moreover, such “intent is
clearly consistent with the body of statutory and decisional law which
places great emphasis on the rights of family members to receive the
bodies of their loved ones in as undisturbed a condition as possible.”142 Therefore, the court’s broad interpretation of the common
law right of sepulcher allowed the family members to recover.143
In contrast, nearly six years after Bambrick, the First Department in Harris-Cunningham v. Medical Examiner of New York
County144 shifted to narrowly interpreting § 4214 to bar a widow
from recovering for interfering with her right to properly bury her decedent husband.145 The widow claimed she suffered an emotional injury when the M.E. conducted an autopsy without consent and
against her religious belief.146 However, the court held that under
NYPHL § 4214, “the hospital’s affirmative duty to seek written consent did not extend to the M.E.”147 Furthermore, under NYPHL §
4210(c), the M.E. was not obligated to seek consent.148 Therefore,
the court’s narrow interpretation barred the widow from recovering
monetary damages for her decedent husband’s unconsented autopsy.149
Most recently the First Department broadly interpreted the
common law but narrowly interpreted the statutory right to hold that
the defendants were not liable for interfering with the right to a proper burial.150 In Rugova v. City of New York,151 the issue was whether
the failure to notify the family of the death of their son resulted in a
violation of the common law and statute.152 The son died in a car ac-

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
Id.
Id. at 254.
690 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999).
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Harris-Cunningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238, 240.
16 N.Y.S.3d 233 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
Id. at 235.
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cident, and his identity was immediately ascertained.153 However, the
police failed to notify the decedent’s family resulting in the inability
of the family to object to an autopsy based on their religious belief.154
Unfortunately, the family became aware of his death after reading a
newspaper article, and an autopsy was conducted contrary to decedent’s religious views.155
The court held that, under the common law, the defendants
were liable for interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to a proper burial
because the defendants’ untimely notice resulted in the plaintiffs’
emotional distress.156 However, under the statute the defendants were
not liable for their negligent act.157 Because NYPHL § 4210 (c) is the
religious exemption rule, it limits the authority to perform autopsies
and establishes the purpose of protecting the decedent’s remains and
survivors’ feelings.158 The plaintiffs argued that in the absence of a
compelling public necessity, the M.E. was required to seek consent
before conducting the autopsy.159 However, the court reasoned that
under NYPHL article 4210(c), the M.E. was not obligated “to wait
and see if an objection would be made before performing the autopsy.”160 Therefore, the court interpreted the same issue differently under the common law and the statutory right of sepulcher, which led to
two different results.161
IV.

DISCUSSION

The court in Shipley erred in applying a narrow interpretation
and failed to see the importance of a notification requirement.162
Case law suggests that New York courts must broadly interpret the
right of sepulcher.163 The right to interment is a natural act that people of all backgrounds find sacred.164 New York courts have long

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 238.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236–38.
Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240.
Id. at 238.
Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238.
Id.
Id. at 235.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section III. A.; MULQUEEN, supra note 85.
Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
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recognized the importance of this right and thus have protected it by
any means necessary.165 The New York State legislature understood
the significance of the common law right of sepulcher and codified it
in NYPHL article 42 to reflect the public’s interest in the decent burial of unknown decedents.166
Unfortunately, there has been a trend to narrowly interpret the
right of sepulcher based on the failure of understanding its significance.167 For instance, in Harris-Cunningham, the First Department’s omission of Bambrick’s reasoning caused a flawed holding.168
Bambrick explained that under the common law and statute, the control of disposition belongs to the surviving family. 169 Therefore, the
written consent requirement was central to the issue of liability because it maintained the control in the next of kin.170 However, the
court in Harris-Cunningham misunderstood the purpose of the written consent requirement when it neglected to extend the meaning of
hospitals to include an M.E.171 Similar to hospitals, the M.E. is authorized to perform autopsies.172 Hence, an M.E. should also be required to receive a written consent before a dissection.173 Lastly,
Harris-Cunningham misplaced the control of disposition in the M.E.,
contrary to the common law and statutory purpose.174
There is also a trend to allow recovery under the common law
but to deny it under the statute.175 However, the common law and the
statutory right of sepulcher go hand in hand.176 NYPHL article 42
does not revoke the age old law of sepulcher; rather, it upholds it.177
For example, in Rugova, the plaintiff recovered for emotional distress
because defendant’s untimely notice resulted in an interference with
the immediate possession of the body and burial.178 However, under
165

MULQUEEN, supra note 85.
See supra Section III.
167 See, e.g., Juseinoski, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (denying recovery to Muslim plaintiffs because the hospital did not conduct the autopsy).
168 Harris-Cunningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
169 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
170 Id.
171 Harris-Cuningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
172 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4209 (McKinney 2015).
173 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015).
174 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
175 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 235.
176 See supra note 71.
177 See supra note 71.
178 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240.
166
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NYPHL § 4210(c), the defendant was not liable for its negligent
act.179
The plaintiff’s argument that in the absence of a compelling
public necessity, the M.E. was required to seek consent before
conducting the autopsy made sense because if there is no urgent need
to perform the autopsy, i.e., a compelling public necessity, the M.E.
should not arbitrarily take away the next of kin’s right to object. 180
Furthermore, the court distorted the meaning of NYPHL § 4210(c)
when it held that first there must be an objection to an autopsy before
a compelling public necessity is required.181 Alarmingly, the court
acknowledged that the lack of notice was the obvious reason for the
inability to raise an objection.182 Yet, the court refused to interpret
the statute broadly to allow recovery.183 This narrow interpretation
robbed the survivor’s right to object and unreasonably contradicted
the purpose of the common law and statutory right of sepulcher.184
Shipley continued this trend by failing to see the importance
of the next of kin’s right of sepulcher.185 First, when a statutory
scheme that protects a certain class does not provide for civil liability,
a court may impose liability to further the statutory purpose––
something that the court in Shipley failed to do.186 Although it is
clear that the common law and the statute sought to protect the
surviving family members’ right to the immediate possession of the
body for burial purposes, the statute failed to provide civil liability
for the unconsented retention of organs in violation of the common
law.187 Therefore, because organs and tissue samples are sometimes
needed to perform a proper burial and the retention of such body
parts interferes with the right of proper burial, the court in Shipley
should have imposed civil liability on the defendants for interfering
with the Shipleys’ right of sepulcher. 188
Second, the court’s extensive statutory analysis failed to
correctly ascertain legislative intent, which resulted in a flawed
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 238.
Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238; Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S. at 254.
Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 72 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015).
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 69 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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decision.189 The intent of the New York State legislature was to
protect the next of kin’s right to properly bury their deceased.190
Legislative intent is notable in the codification of the common law
right of sepulcher and in the limitation of authority in conducting
dissections.191 The legislature intended to include organs and tissue
samples within the meaning of NYPHL § 4215.192 Including organs
and tissue samples would preserve the integrity of the decedent’s
body, ensure the return of a loved one’s body in as “undisturbed a
condition as possible,” and enable proper burial.193
Lastly, the court’s reasoning that the M.E. had extensive
authority in conducting autopsies is flawed because, although the
M.E. has broad discretion in performing dissections, the statute
tempers that discretion with guidelines.194 Regrettably, the holding in
Shipley has placed the decision of disposition on the M.E. resulting in
a violation of the right of sepulcher.195 Nevertheless, a notification
concerning the condition of the body would help cushion the impact
of this decision.196 The notice would empower survivors to make
informed decisions.197
Although the court in Shipley cited to policy and practical
concerns for rejecting a notification requirement, the New York State
legislature should amend NYPHL article 42 to include it.198 A notice
requirement will prevent a violation of the next of kin’s right of
sepulcher.199 For instance, under NYPHL § 4210(c), a notice of an
impending autopsy safeguards the right to object based on a religious
reason.200 Likewise, under NYPHL § 4214, the OCME, not just

189

See supra Section II.B.
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
191 See Bambrick, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (holding that the legislative intent is clear in the
limitation to perform autopsies); see Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (reasoning that limitations in the statute “evinces an intention to ensure proper return of all body
parts for burial purposes”); see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney
2015) (commenting that the legislature intended to protect next of kin).
192 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
193 See Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474; see also Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 72 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
194 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62 (majority opinion); see Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (holding that NYPHL article 42 limits the performance of autopsies).
195 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 61, 77.
197 Id. at 77.
198 Id. at 61, 77.
199 Id. at 77.
200 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77.
190
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hospitals, would have to notify the next of kin of the impending
dissection, which would allow the survivor to consent.201 Also, under
NYPHL § 4215 a decedent’s body would not be released without first
informing the survivor as to the condition of the body, i.e., the
retention of a brain.202 Finally, the legislative body is in the best
position to implement a notification requirement because it can
accumulate pertinent information that would address policy and
practical concerns.203
V.

CONCLUSION

At first blush, protecting the feelings of a person seems insignificant. However, a closer look at the purpose of protecting those
feelings makes it clear that the common law right of sepulcher is
momentous. The right of sepulcher is an old common law rule that
protects the next of kin’s right to the immediate possession of the decedent’s body for proper burial. New York courts have grasped the
importance of protecting the right of sepulcher and the legislature has
codified the rule within NYPHL article 42. However, although New
York courts had previously broadly interpreted the common law right
of sepulcher and NYPHL article 42 for the purpose of upholding the
next of kin’s right, it began to narrowly interpret the law resulting in
a deterioration of the common law right of sepulcher. New York
courts must be sensitive to the importance of the right of sepulcher,
and fully understand the effect a narrow interpretation has on
survivors. A notification requirement can alleviate much of the
heartache. The New York legislative body should enact statutes to
guide OCME in implementing a notification requirement.
Katherine Calderon

201 See Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238 (failing to notify the plaintiff resulted in an interference with the right to interment).
202 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
203 See Macrelli v. Children’s Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 940, 943, 945 (Mass. 2008) (holding that
the M.E.’s retention of the organ did not violate statute); see also Dorchester Reporter,
http://www.dotnews.com/2014/making-david-s-law-story-love-grief-resolve (last visited
Nov. 1, 2015) (holding in Marcrelli resulted in legislature passing David’s law).
 J.D. Candidate, 2016, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Legal
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